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1 Introduction
Over the past few decades, non-monotonic reasoning has developed to be one
of the most important topics in computational logic and artificial intelligence.
The non-monotonicity here refers to the fact that, while in usual (monotonic)
reasoning adding more axioms leads to potentially more possible conclusions,
in non-monotonic reasoning adding new facts to a knowledge base may prevent
previously valid conclusions. Different ways to introduce non-monotonic aspects
to classical logic have been considered:
(1) The derivation process may be extended using non-monotonic inference
rules.
(2) The logical language may be extended with non-monotonic belief operators.
(3) The definition of semantics may be changed.
In this survey we consider a logical formalism from each of the above possibil-
ities, namely
– Reiter’s default logic (as a candidate for possibility (1) above), which intro-
duces default inference rules of the form α:β
γ
, where α:β
γ
intuitively expresses
that γ can be derived from α as long as β is consistent with our knowledge;
– Moore’s autoepistemic logic (a candidate for (2)), that extends classical logic
with a modal operator L to express the beliefs of an ideal rational agent, in
the sense that Lϕ expresses that ϕ is provable;
– McCarthy’s circumscription (as candidate for (3)), which restricts the seman-
tics to the minimal models of a formula or set of formulae.
Additionally we survey abduction, where one is not interested in inferences from a
given knowledge base but in computing possible explanations for an observation
with respect to a given knowledge base.
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Complexity results for different reasoning tasks for propositional variants of
these logics have been studied already in the nineties. It was shown that in each case,
the complexity is higher than for usual propositional logic (typically complete for
some level of the polynomial-time hierarchy). In recent years, however, a renewed
interest in complexity issues can be observed. One current focal approach is to
consider parameterized problems and identify reasonable parameters that allow for
FPT algorithms. In another approach, the emphasis lies on identifying fragments,
i.e., restriction of the logical language, that allow more efficient algorithms for the
most important reasoning tasks.
In this survey we focus on this second aspect. We describe complexity results
for fragments of logical languages obtained by either restricting the allowed set of
operators (e.g., forbidding negations one might consider only monotone formulae)
or by considering only formulae in conjunctive normal form but with generalized
clause types (which are also called Boolean constraint satisfaction problems).
The algorithmic problems we consider are suitable variants of satisfiability and
implication in each of the logics, but also certain counting problems, where one is
not only interested in the existence of certain objects (e.g., models of a formula)
but asks for their number.
2 Post’s Lattice
In 1941, Post showed that the sets of Boolean functions closed under projections
and arbitrary composition, called clones, form a lattice containing only countably
infinite such closed sets, and he identified a finite base for each of them [Pos41].
The closure operation, denoted by [·], is not arbitrarily chosen but rather captures
an intuitive understanding of expressiveness: Given a set B of Boolean functions,
[B] denotes the set of Boolean functions expressible using functions from B, or
equivalently: computable with Boolean circuits with gates performing functions
from B. Moreover, it is well behaved with respect to computational complexity;
e.g., if Π(B) is a decision problem defined over Boolean circuits with gates corre-
sponding to Boolean functions from B, then Π(B) ≤logm Π(B′) for all finite sets B′
of Boolean functions such that all functions from B can be expressed in B′, i.e.,
B ⊆ [B′]. Similar statements hold for decision problems defined over Boolean
formulae (see [Tho10a]). Post’s lattice thus holds the key to study and classify the
computational complexity of problems parameterized by finite sets of available
Boolean functions. In this section, we will define the required terms and notation
to introduce Post’s lattice.
Let L be the set of propositional formulae, i.e., the set of formulae defined via
ϕ ::= a | f (ϕ, . . . , ϕ),
where a is a proposition and f is an n-ary Boolean function (we do not distinguish
between connectives and their associated functions). For a finite set B set of
Boolean functions, a B-formula is a Boolean formula using functions from B only.
The set of all B-formulae is denoted by L(B).
A clone is a set of Boolean functions that is closed under superposition, i.e.,
B contains all projections (that is, the functions Inm(x1, . . . , xn) = xm for n ∈ N and
1 ≤ m ≤ n) and is closed under arbitrary composition [Pip79]. For a set B of
Boolean functions, we denote by [B] the smallest clone containing B and call B a
base for [B]. A B-formula g is called B-representation of f if f ≡ g.
Post showed that the set of all clones ordered by inclusion together with meet
A ∧ B = [A ∩ B] and join A ∨ B = [A ∪ B] forms the lattice depicted in Figure 1.
To give the list of all the clones, we need the following properties. Say that a set
A ⊆ {0, 1}n is c-separating, c ∈ {0, 1}, if there exists an i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
(a1, . . . , an) ∈ A implies ai = c. Let f be an n-ary Boolean function and define the
dual of f to be the Boolean function dual( f )(x1, . . . , xn) := ¬ f (¬x1, . . . ,¬xn). We
say that:
– f is c-reproducing if f (c, . . . , c) = c, c ∈ {0, 1};
– f is c-separating if f −1(c) is c-separating, c ∈ {0, 1};
– f is c-separating of degree m if all A ⊆ f −1(c) with |A| = m are c-separating;
– f is monotone if a1 ≤ b1, . . . , an ≤ bn implies f (a1, . . . , an) ≤ f (b1, . . . , bn);
– f is self-dual if f ≡ dual( f ); here, dual( f )(x1, . . . , xn) = ¬ f (¬x1, . . . ,¬xn);
– f is affine if f (x1, . . . , xn) ≡ x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn ⊕ c with c ∈ {0, 1};
– f is essentially unary if f depends on at most one variable.
The above properties canonically extend to sets of Boolean functions. The list
of all clones is given in Table 1, where id denotes the identity I11 and T
n+1
n is
the (n + 1)-ary threshold function with threshold n defined as Tn+1n (x0, . . . , xn) :=∨n
i=0(x0 ∧ · · · ∧ xi−1 ∧ xi+1 ∧ · · · ∧ xn), i.e., Tn+1n (x0, . . . , xn) is 1 if at least n of its
inputs are 1.
The following easy observation, which will be useful in the subsequent sections,
gives a a first example of the relationship between function-restricted sets of
Boolean formulae.
Lemma 2.1 Let B be a finite set of Boolean functions and let L be a set of (B∪{1})-
formulae. Then L can be transformed in logspace into a set L′ of B-formulae such
that the number of satisfying assignments of L and L′ coincide.
Proof sketch. The idea is to add a fresh proposition t to L and to replace all
occurrences of the constant 1 with t. As a result we obtain that, for problems Π
defined over sets of Boolean formulae, Π(B ∪ {1}) ≡logm Π(B). 
Clone Definition Base
BF All Boolean functions {x ∧ y,¬x}
R0 { f ∈ BF | f is 0-reproducing} {x ∧ y, x ⊕ y}
R1 { f ∈ BF | f is 1-reproducing} {x ∨ y, x↔ y}
R2 R0 ∩ R1 {x ∨ y, x ∧ (y↔ z)}
M { f ∈ BF | f is monotone} {x ∧ y, x ∨ y, 0, 1}
M0 M ∩ R0 {x ∧ y, x ∨ y, 0}
M1 M ∩ R1 {x ∧ y, x ∨ y, 1}
M2 M ∩ R2 {x ∧ y, x ∨ y}
S0 { f ∈ BF | f is 0-separating} {x→ y}
Sn0 { f ∈ BF | f is 0-separating of degree n} {x→ y, dual(Tn+1n )}
S1 { f ∈ BF | f is 1-separating} {x 9 y}
Sn1 { f ∈ BF | f is 1-separating of degree n} {x 9 y,Tn+1n }
Sn02 S
n
0 ∩ R2 {x ∨ (y ∧ ¬z), dual(Tn+1n )}
S02 S0 ∩ R2 {x ∨ (y ∧ ¬z)}
Sn01 S
n
0 ∩M {dual(Tn+1n ), 1}
S01 S0 ∩M {x ∨ (y ∧ z), 1}
Sn00 S
n
0 ∩ R2 ∩M {x ∨ (y ∧ z), dual(Tn+1n )}
S00 S0 ∩ R2 ∩M {x ∨ (y ∧ z)}
Sn12 S
n
1 ∩ R2 {x ∧ (y ∨ ¬z),Tn+1n }
S12 S1 ∩ R2 {x ∧ (y ∨ ¬z)}
Sn11 S
n
1 ∩M {Tn+1n , 0}
S11 S1 ∩M {x ∧ (y ∨ z), 0}
Sn10 S
n
1 ∩ R2 ∩M {x ∧ (y ∨ z),Tn+1n }
S10 S1 ∩ R2 ∩M {x ∧ (y ∨ z)}
D { f ∈ BF | f is self-dual} {(x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ ¬z) ∨ (¬y ∧ ¬z)}
D1 D ∩ R2 {(x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ ¬z) ∨ (y ∧ ¬z)}
D2 D ∩M {(x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z) ∨ (y ∧ z)}
L { f ∈ BF | f is affine} {x ⊕ y, 1}
L0 L ∩ R0 {x ⊕ y}
L1 L ∩ R1 {x↔ y}
L2 L ∩ R2 {x ⊕ y ⊕ z}
L3 L ∩ D {x ⊕ y ⊕ z ⊕ 1}
E { f ∈ BF | f is constant or a conjunction} {x ∧ y, 0, 1}
E0 E ∩ R0 {x ∧ y, 0}
E1 E ∩ R1 {x ∧ y, 1}
E2 E ∩ R2 {x ∧ y}
V { f ∈ BF | f is constant or a disjunction} {x ∨ y, 0, 1}
V0 V ∩ R0 {x ∨ y, 0}
V1 V ∩ R1 {x ∨ y, 1}
V2 V ∩ R2 {x ∨ y}
N { f ∈ BF | f is essentially unary} {¬x, 0, 1}
N2 N ∩ D {¬x}
I { f ∈ BF | f is constant or a projection} {id, 0, 1}
I0 I ∩ R0 {id, 0}
I1 I ∩ R1 {id, 1}
I2 I ∩ R2 {id}
Table 1: List of all clones with definition and bases
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Figure 1: Post’s lattice
3 Default Logic
Default logic is among the best known and most successful formalisms for non-
monotonic reasoning. It was proposed by Raymond Reiter in 1980 [Rei80] and
extends classical logic with default rules, i.e., defeasible inference rules with an
additional justification. These capture the process of deriving conclusions based
on inferences of the form “in the absence of contrary information, assume . . . ”. As
with few exceptions most of our knowledge about the world is almost true rather
than an absolute truth, Reiter argued that his logic is an adequate formalization
of the human reasoning under the closed world assumption, which allows one to
assume the negation of all facts not derivable from the given knowledge base.
Formally, a default rule is an expression of the form α:β
γ
, where α, β, γ are
formulae; α is called the premise, β is called justification, and γ is called conclusion.
Further, a default theory is a pair (W,D), where W is a set of formulae and D is a
set of default rules. The intended interpretation of default rules is that γ holds if α
can be derived and β is consistent with our knowledge and beliefs about the world.
It is this consistency condition that introduces the non-monotonicity:
Example 3.1 Consider the default theory (W,D) with W := {x},D :=
{
x:y
z
}
. Then
we should be able to derive z from (W,D), as x is a fact from W and y is consistent
with the consequences of W ∪ {z}. However, if W is extended with {¬y} then W is
no longer consistent with the justification of x:yz and we have no right to conclude z.
The addition of ¬y to W thus invalidates the consequence z.
As another consequence, the derivable knowledge depends on the set of applied
defaults:
Example 3.2 Consider the default theory (∅,D) with D :=
{
1:x
¬y ,
1:y
¬x
}
. If we apply
the left default, then ¬y is derivable while the right default is blocked, as its
justifications is inconsistent with the conclusion ¬y. On the other hand, if we apply
the right default first, then ¬x is derived and the left default rule gets blocked.
Thus, to appropriately represent the knowledge derivable from a default theory,
we introduce the notion of stable extensions.
Definition 3.3 ([Rei80]) Let (W,D) be a default theory and E be a set of formulae.
Let E0 := W and Ei+1 := Th(Ei) ∪
{
γ
∣∣∣∣ α:βγ ∈ D, α ∈ Ei and ¬β < E} . Then E is a
stable extension of (W,D) if and only if E =
⋃
i∈N Ei.
Stable extensions can alternatively be characterized as the least fixed points
of an operator ΓW,D: For a given default theory (W,D) and a set E of formulae, let
ΓW,D(E) be the smallest set of formulae such that
1. W ⊆ Γ(E),
2. Γ(E) is deductively closed (i.e., ΓW,D(E) = Th(ΓW,D(E))), and
3. for all α:β
γ
∈ D with α ∈ ΓW,D(E) and ¬β < E, it holds that γ ∈ ΓW,D(E)
(in this case, we also say that the default α:β
γ
is applicable).
Proposition 3.4 ([Rei80]) Let (W,D) be a default theory and a E be a set of
formulae. Then E is a stable extension of (W,D) iff E is a fixed point of ΓW,D.
We have already observed in Example 3.2 that a default theory may possess
several stable extensions; indeed, a default theory with n default rules may have
any number of different stable extensions between 0 and 2n. Thus the following
questions naturally arise:
(Extension existence) Does a given default theory admit a stable extension?
(Credulous reasoning) Is a given formula contained in at least one stable
extension of a given default theory?
(Skeptical reasoning) And, finally, is a given formula contained in all stable
extensions of a given default theory?
The computational complexity of the corresponding decision problems was first
explored by Kautz and Selman [KS91], and Stillman [Sti90], who both presented
results for syntactically restricted fragments of disjunction-free default logics. In
1992, Gottlob [Got92] and Stillman [Sti92] then independently showed that the
computational complexity of these questions is presumably higher than that of the
corresponding satisfiability and implication problem in propositional logic:
Theorem 3.5 ([Got92, Sti92]) The extension existence problem and the credu-
lous reasoning problem for default logic are Σp2-complete, whereas the skeptical
reasoning problem for default logic is Πp2-complete.
More recently, Liberatore and Schaerf [LS05] showed that model checking
(i.e., the task to decide whether a given assignment is a model of any extension
of a given default theory) is Σp2-complete, too. And Ben-Eliyahu-Zohary [BEZ02]
extended the complexity landscape of default logics with results on disjunction-free
fragments dual to those studied by Kautz and Selman, and Stillman. The study of
these fragments was motivated by embeddings of other formalisms into default
logic. However, little was known about the complexity of not-disjunction-free
default logics. In [BMTV09b], the authors devise a systematic study of the frag-
ments of default logic obtained by restricting the set of available Boolean functions.
The results provide insight into the source of the hardness of default reasoning
and reveal the trade-off between expressivity and computational complexity of
fragments of default logic.
To present the results, let B be a finite set of Boolean functions. Say that the
default theory (W,D) is a B-default theory if W ∪
{
α, β, γ
∣∣∣∣ α:βγ } ⊆ L(B) and let
B-default logic denote default logic restricted to B-default theories.
Theorem 3.6 ([BMTV09b]) Let B be a finite set of Boolean functions. Then the
extension existence problem for B-default logic is
1. Σp2-complete if S1 ⊆ [B] or D ⊆ [B],
2. ∆p2-complete if S11 ⊆ [B] ⊆ M,
3. NP-complete if [B] ∈ {N,N2, L, L0, L3},
4. P-complete if [B] ∈ {V,V0,E,E0},
5. NL-complete if [B] ∈ {I, I0}, and
6. trivial in all other cases (that is, if [B] ⊆ R1),
via logspace many-one reductions.
A key observation to the proof of this theorem is the following lemma.
Lemma 3.7 Let B be a finite set of Boolean functions. If [B] ⊆ M then any B-
default theory has at most one stable extension; if [B] ⊆ R1 then any B-default
theory has at exactly one stable extension.
Proof. Suppose first that [B] ⊆ M. Then each function f ∈ B is either 1-
reproducing or equivalent to 0. Default rules with a justification equivalent to
0 are not applicable unless W is inconsistent. As in this case L is the only stable
extension of the default theory [Rei80, Corollary 2.3], we w.l.o.g. suppose that all
justifications are 1-reproducing, i.e., [B] ⊆ R1. Now observe that the negation of a
1-reproducing function is not 1-reproducing while all consequents of 1-reproducing
functions are. Indeed, if [B] ⊆ R1 then any stable extension of a default theory is
consistent and satisfied by the assignment setting to 1 all propositions, which also
satisfies the justification of each default rule. Thus any monotone default theory
may possess at most one stable extension while any 1-reproducing default theory
possesses exactly one stable extension. 
We will sketch the proof of Theorem 3.6.
Proof sketch. For S1 ⊆ [B] or D ⊆ [B], the Σp2-hardness follows from Theorem 3.5
and Lemma 2.1, as [S1 ∪ {1}] = [D ∪ {1}] = BF and the upper bound easily
generalizes from {∧,∨,¬} to arbitrary sets of Boolean functions.
The case [B] ⊆ R1 follows directly from Lemma 3.7. It hence remains to
consider those sets B such that [B ∪ {1}] contains the constant 0. These are all
included in either the clone M or the clone L (or both).
For S11 ⊆ [B] ⊆ M, membership in ∆p2 follows similarly from Lemmas 2.1
and 3.7: the only way for a monotone default theory not to possess a stable
extension is to contain a default rule α:β
γ
such that γ ≡ 0. It thus suffices to
compute the set of applicable defaults using subsequent calls to a coNP-oracle
for B-formula implication and to verify that their conclusions are satisfied by the
assignment setting to 1 all propositions. It is straightforward to implement this as a
∆
p
2-algorithm. The ∆
p
2-hardness on the other hand is established using a reduction
from the sequentially nested satisfiability problem, which was first identified to be
∆
p
2-complete in [Got95a, Theorem 3.4] (see also [LMS01]).
If one further restricts the set B such that [B] ∈ {V,V0,E,E0} (i.e., [B∪{1}] does
contain the Boolean constants and either conjunctions or disjunctions), then formula
implication and the the extension existence problem become tractable [BMTV09a].
Indeed, the problem becomes P-complete, as can be shown by a reduction from a
variant of the circuit value problem.
Further restricting the set B such that [B] ∈ {I, I0} (i.e., [B ∪ {1}] does only
contain the Boolean constants) leads to default theories with rules whose premise
and conclusion are a single proposition. As a result, the existence of a stable
extension reduces to the complement of the reachability problem in directed graphs.
Similarly, reachability in such graphs can be transformed into the question whether
a stable extension does not have a stable extension. As this problem is NL-complete
and NL is closed under complement, the extension existence problem for such
default theories is NL-complete.
Finally, for [B] ∈ {L, L0, L3,N,N2} (i.e., ¬ ∈ [B ∪ {1}] and [B] is affine), we
observe a different situation. There may exist exponentially many different stable
extensions; yet, the verification of a candidate is tractable because implication
and satisfiability of B-formulae are [BMTV09a]. Hence, the extension existence
problem becomes solvable in NP. The NP-hardness, on the other hand, is obtained
by reducing from the satisfiability problem for 3CNF formulae: given a formula
ϕ ≡ ∧ni=1 ci with ci ≡ `i1 ∨ `i2 ∨ `i3, we construct the default theory (∅,D) with
D :=
{1 : xi
xi
,
1 : ¬xi
¬xi
∣∣∣∣∣ xi ∈ Vars(ϕ)} ∪ {`i1 : `i2`i3
∣∣∣∣∣ 1 ≤ i ≤ n},
where, for a literal `, ` denotes the literal of opposite polarity, and for a formula
ϕ, Vars(ϕ) denotes the set of all variables in ϕ. It is easy to verify the correctness
of this reduction. As the above default theory can easily be written as a B-default
theory for all B such that ¬ ∈ [B], the proof is complete. 
Remark 3.8 As default rules require the justification β to be consistent with a
stable extension E (i.e., ¬β < E), another conceivable formalization of B-default
logic would be to require α and γ to be B-formulae and β to be the negation of a
B-formula. For this formalization, the extension existence problem for B-default
logic is Σp2-complete if S00 ⊆ [B] or S10 ⊆ [B] or D2 ⊆ [B], and tractable otherwise
(with this case splitting into ⊕L-complete cases and logspace-solvable cases).
Given the upper and lower bounds for the stable extension problem it is easy to
settle the complexity of the credulous and skeptical reasoning problem. Define the
credulous (resp. skeptical) reasoning problem for B-default logic as the problem to
decide, given a B-default theory (W,D) and a B-formula ϕ, whether ϕ is contained
in a stable extension (resp. all stable extensions) of (W,D).
Theorem 3.9 ([BMTV09b]) Let B be a finite set of Boolean functions. Then the
credulous (resp. skeptical) reasoning problem for B-default logic is
1. Σp2-complete (resp. Π
p
2-complete) if S1 ⊆ [B] or D ⊆ [B],
2. ∆p2-complete if S11 ⊆ [B] ⊆ M,
3. coNP-complete if S00 ⊆ [B] ⊆ R1 or S10 ⊆ [B] ⊆ R1 or D2 ⊆ [B] ⊆ R1,
4. NP-complete (resp. coNP-complete) if [B] ∈ {N,N2, L, L0, L3},
5. P-complete if V2 ⊆ [B] ⊆ V or E2 ⊆ [B] ⊆ E or [B] ∈ {L1, L2}, and
6. NL-complete in all other cases (that is, if [B] ⊆ I),
via logspace many-one reductions.
Another possibility to study fragments of default logic, aside restricting the
available Boolean functions, is Schaefer’s framework [Sch78]. This framework is
motivated by constraint satisfaction problem, where a set of conditions represented
as logical relations has to be simultaneously satisfied. Hence, the set W and
the formulae occurring in D are assumed to be a set of applications of relations
from S to the variables in Vars(W) ∪ Vars(D), where Vars(D) is a shorthand for
Vars
({
α, β, γ
∣∣∣ α:β
γ
∈ D}). That is, W and the formulae occurring in D are of the
form {R1(x11, . . . , x1m1), . . . ,Rn(xn1, . . . , xnmn)}, where the Ri’s are relations of arity
mi from a fixed set S of available relations over the domain {0, 1} and the variables
x11, . . . , xnmn are from Vars(W) ∪Vars(D). Such a set of applications of relations is
correspondingly said to be satisfied by an assignment σ if (σ(xi1), . . . , σ(ximi)) ∈ Ri
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Call a relation R Schaefer if it is either
– affine (coincides with the set of models of an {⊕}-formula),
– bijunctive (coincides with the set of models of a 2CNF formula),
– Horn (coincides with the set of models of a Horn formula), or
– dual Horn (coincides with the set of models of a dual Horn formula).
And say that a set of relations is Schaefer if there is one of the above four properties
that is satisfied by all relations in S . Call a default theory (W,D) such that W ∪{
α, β, γ
∣∣∣∣ α:βγ } is a set of applications of relations from S a default theory over
relations from S .
We define the extension existence problem for default logic over relations from
S as the problem to decide, given a default theory (W,D) over relations from S ,
whether (W,D) has a stable extension. Further, define the credulous (resp. skeptical)
reasoning problem for default logic over relations from S as the problem to decide,
given a default theory (W,D) over relations from S and a set ϕ of applications of
relations from S , whether ϕ is contained in at least one (resp. any) stable extension
of (W,D). In [CHS07], Chapdelaine et al. study the complexity of these problems
and establish the following trichotomies:
Theorem 3.10 ([CHS07, Sch07]) Let S be a set of relations. Then the extension
existence problem for default logic over relations from S is
1. Σp2-complete if S is not Schaefer,
2. NP-complete if S is Schaefer but neither 0-valid or 1-valid,
3. in P in all other cases.
Theorem 3.11 ([CHS07, Sch07]) Let S be a set of relations. Then the credulous
(resp. skeptical) reasoning problem for default logic over relations from S is
1. Σp2-complete if S is not Schaefer,
2. NP-complete (resp. coNP-complete) if S is Schaefer but neither 0-valid nor
1-valid,
3. coNP-complete if S 0-valid or 1-valid but not Schaefer,
4. in P in all other cases.
For detailed proofs of these results, see [Sch07].
We like to remark that also results like these about Boolean constraint satis-
faction problems are proved using Post’s lattice. This is because the classes of
Boolean relations above (affince, bijunctive, Horn, dual Horn) can all be defined
using so called polymorphism, a kind of closure property, of Boolean relations.
These sets of polymorphism are always clones, i.e., they appear somewhere in the
lattice. To state only one example, a relation is Horn iff the set of its polymorphisms
is the class E2. The structure of the lattice is then used in the proof to make a
case distinction on all possible sets of polymorphisms of S and determine the
complexity in each case. For more details, we refer the reader to [CV08].
Having settled the complexity of these decision problems, mind that these
results do only speak about the existence of objects, e.g., stable extensions. But
what about the complexity of counting them? We will conclude this survey of the
complexity of default logic with a treatment of the problem to count the number
stable extensions.
Let us introduce the relevant notions and counting complexity classes first.
For alphabets Σ and Π, let A ⊆ Σ? × Π? be a binary relation such that the set
A(x) := {y ∈ Π? | (x, y) ∈ A} is finite for all x ∈ Σ?. We write #A to denote the
following counting problem: Given x ∈ Σ?, compute |A(x)|. The class of counting
problems computable in polynomial time is denoted by FP. To characterize the
complexity of counting problems that are not known to be in FP, we follow [HV95]
and define an operator #·C on classes C of decision problems: #A ∈ #·C if (a)
there exists a polynomial p, such that for all x and all y ∈ A(x), |y| ≤ p(|x|) and
(b) the problem to decide, given x and y, whether y ∈ A(x) is in C. Clearly, #·P
coincides with #P, the class of functions counting the number of accepting path
of nondeterministic polynomial-time Turing machines—the natural analogue of
NP in the counting complexity context [Val79]. Applying #· to the classes of the
polynomial hierarchy, we now obtain a linearly ordered hierarchy of counting
complexity classes [Tod91, HV95]: #P ⊆ #·NP ⊆ #·coNP = #·PNP ⊆ #·Σp2 ⊆
#·Πp2 = #·PΣ
p
2 ⊆ · · · .
The counting complexity of default logic has, to the authors’ best knowledge,
first been considered in [Tho10b]. There, it was shown that counting the number
of stable extensions is complete for the second level of the counting polynomial
hierarchy, #·coNP, whenever [B ∪ {1}] = BF; becomes ∆p2-complete for all sets B
such that [B∪ {1}] = M; complete for the first level of the counting hierarchy for all
affine sets B such that ¬ can be implemented from B∪ {1}; and becomes efficiently
computable in all other cases. The counting complexity thus decreases analogously
to the complexity of the extension existence problem. However, observe that
we blur over the distinction between decision problems and their characteristic
functions: By Lemma 3.7 any monotone B-default theory has at most one stable
extension. The problem to count the number stable extensions thus coincides with
the characteristic function of the extension existence problem, which ∆p2-complete.
Theorem 3.12 ([Tho10b]) Let B be a finite set of Boolean functions. Then the
problem to count the number of stable extensions in B-default logic is
1. #·coNP-complete if S1 ⊆ [B] or D ⊆ [B],
2. ∆p2-complete if S11 ⊆ [B] ⊆ M,
3. #P-complete if [B] ∈ {N,N2, L, L0, L3},
4. in FP in all other cases (that is, if [B] ⊆ V or [B] ⊆ E or [B] ⊆ R1)
via parsimonious reductions.
Note that for the classification in Theorem 3.12 the conceptually simple and
well-behaved parsimonious reductions are sufficient (a counting problem #A parsi-
moniously reduces to a counting problem #B if there is a polynomial-time com-
putable function f such that for all inputs x, |A(x)| = |B( f (x))| [Val79]), while
for related classifications in the literature less restrictive and more complicated
reductions had to be used (see, e.g., [DHK05, HP07, BBC+10]).
4 Autoepistemic Logic
Autoepistemic logic was introduced by Moore [Moo85] to overcome some of the
peculiarities of the non-monotonic logics devised by McDermott and Doyle [MD80]
and McDermott [McD82]. While Moore defined autoepistemic logic without re-
ferring to any particular modal system, it turned out that his logic coincides with
the non-monotonic modal logic based on KD45 [Shv90]. Therefore, autoepis-
temic logic can be considered a popular representative among the non-monotonic
modal logics. The connection of these logics and particularly autoepistemic logic
to default logic has been extensively studied. The first major approach in this
direction was taken by Konolige [Kon88], who showed that default logic can be
embedded into autoepistemic logic using slightly different semantics for the lat-
ter. Subsequently, Marek and Truszczynski [MT89, MT90] showed that, using
strengthened notions in autoepistemic logic or weakened notions in default logic,
the two logics coincide in terms of expressivity. Finally, Gottlob [Got95b] showed
that default logic can be embedded into standard autoepistemic logic, while the
converse direction was shown to hold by Janhunen [Jan99].
The intention of Moore was to create a logic modelling the beliefs of an ideally
rational agent, i.e., an agent that believes all things he can deduce and refutes belief
in everything else. To this end, autoepistemic logic extends propositional logic
with the modal operator L stating that its argument “is believed”. The set of all
autoepistemic formulae Lae is defined as
ϕ ::= a | f (ϕ, . . . , ϕ) | Lϕ,
where a is a proposition and f is a Boolean function, and the relation |= is extended
to simply treat formulae starting with an L as atomic. Similarly to default logic,
the semantics of autoepistemic logic are defined in terms of fixed points, which in
the context of autoepistemic logic are called stable expansions:
Definition 4.1 ([Moo85]) Let Σ ⊆ Lae be a set of autoepistemic formulae. A set
∆ ⊆ Lae is a stable expansion of Σ if it satisfies the equation
∆ = Th(Σ ∪ L(∆) ∪ ¬L(Lae \ ∆)),
where L(∆) := {Lϕ | ϕ ∈ ∆} and ¬L(Lae \ ∆) := {¬Lϕ | ϕ < ∆}.
Example 4.2 Consider the set Σ = {Lx ∨ y, x ∨ Ly, L(x ∨ y)→ z} of autoepistemic
formulae. We claim that Σ has two stable expansions, each of which containing
z. Sticking with our informal interpretation of autoepistemic logic as the logic
of an ideally rational agent’s beliefs, observe that we cannot deduce x from Σ.
Hence, we would assign Lx the value 0 and consequently be able to derive y from
Lx∨ y. This in turn allows us to conclude z from L(x∨ y)→ z, as x∨ y is derivable
from y. Indeed, the set
⋃
i∈N ∆i of formulae recursively defined via ∆0 := {x} and
∆i := Th(Σ ∪ L(∆i−1) ∪ ¬L(Lae \ ∆i−1)) is a stable expansion of Σ that contains z.
On the other hand, we are not able to deduce y from Σ either. Hence, we could
also continue to assign to Ly the value 0 and be therefore able to derive x. Again,
we may conclude z from L(x ∨ y)→ z. And just as above, ⋃i∈N ∆′i with ∆′0 := {y}
and ∆′i defined as ∆i is a stable expansion of Σ that contains z.
There is an important difference to default logic as stable expansions need not
be minimal fixed points:
Example 4.3 Consider Σ′ := {Lp→ p}. The set Σ′ has two stable expansions, one
stable expansion containing ¬Lp and the other one containing Lp. As an iterative
construction as in Example 4.2 is deemed to fail for the latter, it may be considered
ungrounded in the set of premises Σ.
Clearly, sets of autoepistemic formulae can also posses no or a single stable ex-
pansion. Hence, the expansion existence problem, the credulous reasoning problem
and the skeptical reasoning problem arise just as in default logic. The first treatment
of the complexity of these problems has been performed by Niemelä [Nie90]. In
his paper, he gave a finite characterization of stable expansions in terms of full sets:
Let SFL(Σ) denote the set of L-prefixed subformulae of formulae in Σ.
Definition 4.4 ([Nie90]) Let Σ ⊆ Lae be a set of autoepistemic formulae. A set
Λ ⊆ SFL(Σ) ∪ {¬Lϕ | Lϕ ∈ SFL(Σ)} is Σ-full if for all Lψ ∈ SFL(Σ):
– Σ ∪ Λ |= ψ iff Lψ ∈ Λ.
– Σ ∪ Λ 6|= ψ iff ¬Lψ ∈ Λ.
Proposition 4.5 ([Nie90]) Let Σ ⊆ Lae be a set of autoepistemic formulae. If
Λ is a Σ-full set, then there exists exactly one stable expansion of ∆ such that
Λ ⊆ L(∆) ∪ ¬L(Lae \ ∆). Vice versa, if ∆ is a stable expansion of Σ, then there
exists exactly one Σ-full set Λ such that such that Λ ⊆ L(∆) ∪ ¬L(Lae \ ∆).
Using full sets as finite representations for stable expansions, Niemelä obtained
a Σp2 upper bound for the expansion existence problem and the credulous reasoning
problem, and a Πp2 upper bound for the skeptical reasoning problem: for the
expansion existence problem, simply guess a candidate for a full set and verify
the conditions given in Definition 4.4 using an oracle for formula implication.
To extend this idea to the credulous and skeptical reasoning problem, one still
needs to define a consequence relation |=L that, given Σ ⊆ Lae and a Σ-full set Λ
implies exactly those formulae contained in the stable expansion corresponding
to Λ. Niemelä shows that |=L can be defined such that the problem of deciding
the relation Turing reduces to the implication problem. From this it is easy to
see that the credulous and skeptical reasoning problem are contained in Σp2 and
Π
p
2 respectively. The matching lower bounds were later established by Gottlob
in [Got92].
Theorem 4.6 ([Nie90, Got92]) The expansion existence problem and the credulous
reasoning problem for autoepistemic logic are Σp2-complete, whereas the skeptical
reasoning problem for autoepistemic logic is Πp2-complete.
The hardness is obtained using a surprisingly simple reduction form the valid-
ity problem for quantified Boolean formulae of the form ∃x1 · · · ∃xn∀y1 · · · ∀ymψ,
where ψ is a propositional formula with Vars(ψ) = {xi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}∪{yi | 1 ≤ i ≤ m}.
Given a formula of the above form, we transform it into a set Σ of autoepistemic
formulae defined as
Σ := {Lxi ↔ xi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {Lψ}.
The idea behind the reduction is to mimic existential quantification using different
sets of beliefs such that an assignment satisfying ∀y1 · · · ∀ymψ results in a stable
expansion: If σ is an assignment that satisfies ∀y1 · · · ∀ymψ, then the Σ ∪ Λ with
Λ = {Lψ} ∪ {Lxi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {¬Lx1 | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} entails ψ; therefore, Λ is a
Σ-full set. On the other hand, if Λ is a full set, then we can reconstruct from it an
assignment satisfying ∀y1 · · · ∀ymψ.
Beyond this, the complexity of these problems for fragments of autoepistemic
logic has seemingly only been studied in [CMTV10]. There, it was shown that
already autoepistemic logic using only ∧ and ∨ is Σp2-complete and that tractable
fragments occur only for affine sets of Boolean functions. To present the results,
say that, for a finite set B of Boolean functions, an autoepistemic B-formula
is an autoepistemic formula using Boolean functions from a given finite set B
only, and denote by Lae(B) the set of all autoepistemic B-formulae. Further,
let B-autoepistemic logic denote autoepistemic logic restricted to autoepistemic
B-formulae and define the credulous (resp. skeptical) reasoning problem for B-
autoepistemic logic as the problem to decide, given a set Σ of autoepistemic
B-formulae and an autoepistemic B-formula ϕ, whether ϕ is contained in a stable
expansion (resp. all stable expansions) of Σ .
Theorem 4.7 ([CMTV10]) Let B be a finite set of Boolean functions. Then the
expansion existence problem and the credulous (resp. skeptical) reasoning problem
for B-autoepistemic logic are
1. Σp2-complete (resp. Π
p
2-complete) if D2 ⊆ [B] or S00 ⊆ [B] or S10 ⊆ [B],
2. NP-complete (resp. coNP-complete) if V2 ⊆ [B] ⊆ V,
3. ⊕L-hard and contained in P if L2 ⊆ [B] ⊆ L,
4. in L in all other cases (that is, if [B] ⊆ E),
via logspace many-one reductions.
Note that the complexity classification of these problems substantially differs
from their analogues in default logic, which can be credited to the different approach
to modelling non-monotonicity: while default logic is limited to consistency testing
in the justification of a default rule, autoepistemic logic is capable of both positive
and negative introspection. As another result, in general the intertranslatability of
autoepistemic logic and default logic does not hold for fragments of these logics
(unless collapses considered unlikely occur).
We will briefly present the ideas behind Theorem 4.7. To start with, the proof
relies on the following lemma, which significantly reduces the number of clones to
be considered.
Lemma 4.8 Let B be a finite set of Boolean functions and Σ ⊆ Lae(B∪{0, 1}). Then
we can construct in logspace a set Σ′ ⊆ Lae(B) such that the stable expansions of
Σ and Σ′ coincide on all autoepistemic formulae over Vars(Σ).
Proof. Let Σ ⊆ Lae(B ∪ {0, 1}) be given. We first eliminate the constant 1 using
Lemma 2.1 and transform the resulting set Σ′ to Σ′′ by substituting all occurrences
of 0 with the formula L f , where f is a fresh proposition. Suppose that ∆ is a
consistent stable expansion of Σ′′. As f cannot be derived from Σ′′, ∆ has to
contain the ¬L f . Hence any satisfying assignment of ∆ sets L f to 0. 
It thus suffices to consider the complexity of the expansion existence problem
for sets B such that [B] ∈ {BF,M,E,V, L,N, I}. The key observation in the proof of
Theorem 4.7 is that the reductions from the validity problem for quantified Boolean
formulae of the form ∃x1 · · · ∃xn∀y1 · · · ∀ymψ with ψ in negation normal form does
not requires negations: Given a formula ϕ in the above form, replace all negative
literals ¬xi and ¬yi in ψ with new propositions x′i and y′i . Call the resulting formula
ϕ′. We then construct the set of autoepistemic {∧,∨}-formulae as
Σ := {Lϕ′} ∪ {Lxi ∨ x′i , xi ∨ Lx′i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {yi ∨ y′i | 1 ≤ i ≤ m}.
Due to the formulae Lxi ∨ x′i , xi ∨ Lx′i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, any stable expansion ∆ of Σ
contains either xi or x′i (but not both), while the formulae yi ∨ y′i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
guarantee that either yi or y′i is set to 1 in any satisfying assignment of ∆. From this,
it is easy to see that ϕ is valid iff Σ has a stable expansion. Hence, the expansion
existence problem is Σp2-complete for S00 ⊆ [B], S10 ⊆ [B], or D2 ⊆ [B].
This construction can be generalized to also work for quantified Boolean
formulae of the form ∃x1 · · · ∃xnψ with ψ in conjunctive normal form. Hence, we
obtain NP-hardness for V2 ⊆ [B]. The corresponding upper bound follows from
the fact the formula implication of B-formulae with [B] ⊆ V is tractable.
For an argument to obtain a polynomial-time upper bound for the remaining
cases, we refer the reader to the original paper. This concludes the discussion of
Theorem 4.7.
Turning to the problem of counting the number of stable expansions, the reader
may easily convince himself that the reductions used to establish the NP-hardness
and Σp2-hardness above are parsimonious. Hence, the complexity classification of
the counting problem is analogous to that of the expansion existence problem:
Theorem 4.9 ([CMTV10]) Let B be a finite set of Boolean functions. Then the
problem to count the number of stable expansions in B-autoepistemic logic is
1. #·coNP-complete if D2 ⊆ [B] or S00 ⊆ [B] or S10 ⊆ [B],
2. #P-complete if V2 ⊆ [B] ⊆ V,
3. in FP in all other cases (that is, if [B] ⊆ L or [B] ⊆ E),
via parsimonious reductions.
Note that again parsimonious reductions are sufficient to obtain the complete-
ness results in Theorem 4.9.
5 Circumscription
The third non-monotonic logic we will turn to is circumscription, which instead of
extending classical logic with default rules or introspection restricts the attention to
minimal models. Circumscription was introduced by McCarthy [McC80] in 1980
to overcome the qualification problem, i.e., the problem of listing all preconditions
required for an action to have its intended effect. His approach was to allow for the
conclusion that the objects that can be shown to have a certain property by reasoning
are all objects that satisfy this property. Following [Lif85], this is achieved by
considering only those models that are minimal with respect to a preorder on the
set of assignments. For ease of notation, we will identify assignments σ with the
set {p | σ(p) = 1}.
Definition 5.1 Let P, Q, Z partition the set of propositions and let σ,σ′ : P ∪ Q ∪
Z → {0, 1} be assignments. Define ≤(P,Z) as the preorder defined by
σ ≤(P,Z) σ′ ⇐⇒ σ ∩ P ⊆ σ′ ∩ P and σ ∩ Q = σ′ ∩ Q.
Using ≤(P,Z), we define a consequence relation |=(P,Z) such that for an assignment
σ : P ∪ Q ∪ Z → {0, 1} and a set of formulae Γ with Vars(Γ) ⊆ P ∪ Q ∪ Z,
σ |=(P,Z) Γ if σ is minimal w.r.t. ≤(P,Z) among all models of Γ.. In this case, σ is
also called a circumscriptive model of Γ. Accordingly, we can define the notion
of (circumscriptive) implication: Γ |=(P,Z) ϕ if ϕ is satisfied in all circumscriptive
models of Γ. It is not hard to see that circumscription coincides with reasoning
under the extended closed world assumption, in which all formulae involving only
propositions from P that cannot be derived from Γ are assumed to be false [GPP89].
Example 5.2 Let P := {x}, Q := ∅, Z := {y, z} and Γ := {(x ∧ ¬y) → z}. The
models of Γ are ∅, {y}, {z}, {x, y}, {y, z}, {x, z}, {y}, and {x, y, z}. Of these, only ∅,
{z}, and {y, z} are minimal with respect to ≤(P,Z). Hence, Γ ∪ {y} |=(P,Z) z, while
Γ ∪ {y} 6|= z.
The notions of circumscriptive models and circumscriptive inference naturally
lead to the following decision problems, that received extensive study in the
literature:
(Circumscriptive model checking) Given a set of formulae Γ, a preorder ≤(P,Z)
on the set of its propositions and an assignment σ, does σ |=(P,Z) Γ hold?
(Circumscriptive inference) Given a set of formulae Γ and a formula ϕ, a
preorder ≤(P,Z) on the set of their propositions, does Γ |=(P,Z) ϕ hold?
The circumscriptive model checking is dual to a generalization of the minimal
satisfiability problem, i.e., the question whether a given formula has a model that is
strictly smaller than a given assignment with respect to a given preorder ≤(P,Z), and
known to be coNP-complete in general [Cad92], whereas the circumscriptive infer-
ence problem was shown to be Πp2-complete by Eiter and Gottlob in [EG93]. These
results reveal that, alike default logic and autoepistemic logic, circumscription
exhibits an increase in the complexity of model checking and reasoning as com-
pared to traditional propositional logic. This increase in the complexity raises the
question for restrictions that lower the complexity of these tasks. Accordingly, the
complexity of these problems has been studied for both restricted sets of Boolean
functions and in Schaefers framework. We will consider the restrictions obtained
from Schaefer’s framework first.
Define the circumscriptive model checking problem for sets of relations from
S as the problem to decide, given a a set Γ of applications of relations from S , an
assignment σ : Vars(Γ)→ {0, 1} and a partition (P,Q,Z) of Vars(Γ), whether σ is
a minimal model of Γ with respect to ≤(P,Z). In [KK01b], Kirousis and Kolaitis
showed that using Schaefer’s framework, the circumscriptive model checking
problem restricted to Q = Z = ∅ is dichotomic, a result which was later generalized
to the general case in [KK03]:
Theorem 5.3 ([KK03]) Let S be a set of relations. Then the circumscriptive model
checking problem for sets of relations from S is
1. coNP-complete if S is not Schaefer and
2. in P in all other cases.
The tractability if S is Schaefer is easy to verify. In this case, the circumscriptive
model checking problem Turing reduces to the satisfiability problem, which in this
case is tractable by [Sch78]. To show the coNP-hardness in all remaining cases,
Kirousis and Kolaitis give an involved three step reduction from 1-in-3 SAT.
In addition to that, Kirousis and Kolaitis also classified for possible sets of
available Boolean functions in an unpublished note. Define the circumscriptive
model checking problem for sets of B-formulae as the problem to decide, given
a set Γ ⊆ L(B), an assignment σ : Vars(Γ) → {0, 1} and a partition (P,Q,Z) of
Vars(Γ), whether σ is a minimal model of Γ with respect to ≤(P,Z).
Theorem 5.4 ([KK01a]) Let B be a finite set of Boolean functions. Then the
circumscriptive model checking problem for sets of B-formulae is
1. coNP-complete if S02 ⊆ [B] or S12 ⊆ [B] or D1 ⊆ [B], and
2. in P in all other cases (that is, if [B] ⊆ M).
Key to the classification is that if the set B of all available Boolean functions
is monotone, then the circumscriptive model checking problem Turing-reduces to
the the model checking problem for monotone Boolean formulae. Given Γ and σ,
denote by σi the assignment obtained by setting all propositions in Z to 1 and the
ith proposition in P, which is set to 1 under σ to 0. Then σ |=(P,Z) Γ iff for all σi
obtained in this way, σi 6|=(P,Z) Γ. Thus circumscriptive model checking problem
for sets of B-formulae is tractable if [B] ⊆ M.
On the other hand, the coNP-hardness follows from the fact that all remaining
sets B satisfy [B ∪ {0, 1}] = BF, while we can simulate the Boolean constants: If
B ⊆ R1, then appealing to Lemma 2.1 suffices. If B ⊆ R1, we use the mapping
Γ 7→ Γ′ := Γ[0/ f , 1/t] ∪ {t, f → ∧ Vars(Γ)}, where Γ[0/ f , 1/t] denotes the set
obtained from Γ by replacing all occurrences of 0 by the fresh proposition f and all
occurrences of 1 by the fresh proposition t. Notice that any model of Γ′ sets t to 1
and that Γ′ is satisfied by exactly those assignments that satisfy Γ and additionally
the assignment setting all propositions to 1. Thus, if B ⊆ R1, we may replace any
Boolean function in the original Γ with an equivalent (B ∪ {0, 1})-formula.
We point out that the original proof in [KK01a] builds on results from [KK01b],
the sketch above provides an alternative proof.
As for the inference problem, the computational complexity of circumscriptive
inference was first studied in 1990 by Cadoli and Lenzerini [CL94], who analyzed
the complexity of reasoning under various closed world assumptions. They showed
that circumscription for various restrictions on the premises, conclusions and the
order still remains intractable and also identified tractable fragments. Yet the
exact complexity of circumscriptive inference remained open until Eiter and Gott-
lob [EG93] proved its Πp2-completeness. This result was further refined both in the
framework of restricted sets of available Boolean functions as well as in Schaefer’s
framework. For the latter, Kirousis and Kolaitis [KK01c] proved a dichotomy
separating the Πp2-complete cases and from those in coNP, and conjectured that
the cases in coNP could be refined into coNP-complete and tractable ones. While
the coNP-completeness for dual Horn relations or bijunctive relations was known
from [CL94] and Durand and Hermann showed that this also holds for for affine
relations [DH03], Nordh finally affirmatively settled Kirousis and Kolaitis’ conjec-
ture in [Nor05]. For the restricted case of basic circumscription that requires Q or
Z or both to be empty, the trichotomy was established in [DHN09]. We state here
the result from [Nor05].
Say that a relation R is negative Horn if it coincides with the set of models
of a Horn formula without positive literals. Define the circumscriptive inference
problem for sets of relations from S as the problem to decide, given a set Γ of
applications of relations from S , a clause ϕ and a partition (P,Q,Z) of Vars(Γ∪{ϕ}),
whether Γ |=(P,Z) ϕ.
Theorem 5.5 ([Nor05]) Let S be a set of relations. Then the circumscriptive
inference problem for sets of relations from S is
1. Πp2-complete if S is not Schaefer,
2. coNP-complete if S is Schaefer but neither negative Horn nor both bijunctive
and affine nor both Horn and dual Horn, and
3. in P in all other case (that is, if S is negative Horn or both bijunctive and
affine or both Horn and dual Horn).
For the approach parameterizing by the set available Boolean functions, the
circumscriptive inference problem for sets of B-formulae was classified in [Tho09].
Define the circumscriptive inference problem for sets of B-formulae as the problem
to decide, given a set Γ ⊆ L(B), a clause ϕ and a partition (P,Q,Z) of Vars(Γ∪{ϕ}),
whether Γ |=(P,Z) ϕ.
Theorem 5.6 ([Tho09]) Let B be a finite set of Boolean functions. Then the
circumscriptive inference problem for sets of B-formulae is
1. Πp2-complete if S02 ⊆ [B] or S12 ⊆ [B] or D1 ⊆ [B],
2. coNP-complete if X ⊆ [B] ⊆ Y for some X ∈ {V2,S10,D2, L2} and Y ∈ {M, L},
and
3. in P in all other case (that is, if [B] ⊆ N or [B] ⊆ E).
Remark 5.7 Unlike the reasoning problems defined for B-default logic and B-
autoepistemic logic, here an arbitrary formula is to be tested for implication. The
complexity of deciding the circumscriptive inference of a B-formula from a set of
B-formulae is the same as above for all sets B except those satisfying L2 ⊆ [B] ⊆ L;
for these the problem is only known to be ⊕L-hard and contained in coNP.
In the remainder of this section, we will consider the counting complexity of
circumscription, namely the problem to count the number of minimal models of
a given set Γ w.r.t. to a given preorder ≤(P,Z). This problem, henceforth referred
to as the circumscriptive model counting problem, has recently gained a lot of
interest. Its restriction to Q = Z = ∅ is equivalent to the minimal model counting
problem, i.e., the problem of counting the number of minimal models w.r.t. the
coordinatewise partial order on assignments induced by 0 < 1. While the problem
to count the number of all models of a given formula is well-known to be #P-
complete via parsimonious reduction [Val79], the exact complexity of the minimal
model counting problem was open for a long time. The problem is easily seen
to belong to #·coNP, since deciding whether a given assignment is among the
minimal models of a given set of formulae is in coNP. Similarly, its #P-hardness
via parsimonious reductions is apparent: the mapping ϕ 7→ {ϕ ∧∧xi∈Vars(ϕ)(xi ⊕ yi)}
with yi < Vars(ϕ) constitutes a parsimonious reduction from the problem to count
the number of all models of a given formula. However, #·coNP-hardness could only
be established using reductions under which not all of the classes of the counting
polynomial hierarchy are closed.
In 2000, Durand, Hermann and Kolaitis [DHK05] introduced the notion of
subtractive reductions which suitably relaxed the notion of parsimonious reductions.
Say that a counting problem #A reduces to a counting problem #B via strong
subtractive reduction if there exists a pair of polynomial-time computable functions
f , g such that for all x, B(g(x)) ⊆ B( f (x)) and |A(x)| = |B( f (x))| − |B(g(x))|.
Subtractive reductions are the transitive closure of strong subtractive reductions,
i.e., #A reduces to #B via subtractive reductions if there exists a finite sequence
(#C)1≤i≤n such that #C1 = #A, #Cn = #B and #Ci reduces to #Ci+1 via strong
subtractive reduction for all 1 ≤ i < n. Clearly, each parsimonious reduction is
also a subtractive reduction. And, more importantly, #P and #·Πpk , for all k ≥ 1, are
closed under subtractive reductions.
Theorem 5.8 ([DHK05]) The minimal model counting problem and the circum-
scriptive model counting problem are #·coNP-complete via subtractive reductions.
The counting complexity of the minimal model counting problem was further
studied in [DH08]. There the authors show that, using Schaefer’s framework, the
restriction to relations that are either dual Horn, bijunctive or affine reduces the
complexity of the problem to #P-completeness, whereas the restriction to Horn
relations or relations that are both bijunctive an affine yields efficiently computable
counting problems. Hence, the counting problem for the case that all relations are
both dual Horn and Horn as well as the case that all relations are negative Horn are
#P-complete while the underlying decision problems are still tractable.
The counting complexity of both the minimal model counting problem and
the circumscriptive model counting problem was further studied in [Tho10b],
where the complexity of the fragments obtained by restricting the set of Boolean
functions is classified. Here, the counting complexity decreases analogously to the
complexity of the underlying decision problem.
Theorem 5.9 ([Tho10b]) Let B be a finite set of Boolean functions. Then the
minimal model counting problem for B-formulae and the circumscriptive model
counting problem for B-formulae is
1. #·coNP-complete via subtractive reductions if S02 ⊆ [B] or S12 ⊆ [B] or
D1 ⊆ [B],
2. #P-complete via subtractive reductions if S00 ⊆ [B] ⊆ M or S10 ⊆ [B] ⊆ M
or D2 ⊆ [B] ⊆ M,
3. #P-complete via Turing reductions if V2 ⊆ [B] ⊆ V or L2 ⊆ [B] ⊆ L, and
4. in FP in all other cases (that is, if [B] ⊆ N or [B] ⊆ E).
6 Abduction
Abduction is a fundamental and important form of non-monotonic reasoning intro-
duced by Peirce [Pei55]. It can be thought of as a form of hypothetical reasoning:
to ask what can be abduced from an observation α is to ask for an explanation,
which in conjunction with the given background knowledge accounts for α. The
importance of this formalism to artificial intelligence was first emphasized by
Morgan [Mor71] and has been fruitfully used in many areas of computer science
such as medical diagnosis [BATJ89], text analysis [HSAM93], system diagno-
sis [SW01], configuration problems [AFM02], temporal knowledge bases [BL00],
and has connections to default reasoning [SL90].
Here we will consider logic based abduction in which the background theory
is represented by a logical theory, specifically in propositional logic. Hence, the
abduction problem can in general be formulated as the problem, given a knowledge
base Γ ⊆ L, a set A ⊆ Vars(Γ) of propositions called hypothesis, and an observation
q ∈ Vars(Γ), to compute a set E ⊆ Lits(A) of literals over A such that Γ ∪ E is
consistent and Γ ∪ E |= q. If such a set E exists, then it is called an explanation for
the abduction problem P = (Γ, A, q).
The computational complexity of this problem has first been considered by
Selman and Levesque [SL90], who showed that it is NP-hard to compute an
explanation if Γ is restricted to Horn clauses. Independently, Friedrich, Gottlob
and Nejdl [FGN90] studied the problem for definite Horn clauses. They show that
deciding whether a given proposition is contained in some or all explanations is
tractable whereas deciding whether a proposition is contained in a subset-minimal
explanation is NP-complete. It is yet tractable to compute some subset-minimal
explanation in this case [Byl91]. Further results were obtained by Eshghi [Esh93],
who proved that finding subset-minimal explanations becomes tractable if Γ is
acyclic Horn and its pseudo-completion is unit-refutable. Finally, the complexity
of logic-based abduction was settled by Eiter and Gottlob.
Theorem 6.1 ([EG95])
1. To decide, given an abduction problem P = (Γ, A, q) and a set E ⊆ Lits(A),
whether E is an explanation for P is DP-complete.
2. To decide, given an abduction problemP, whether there exists an explanation
for P is Σp2-complete.
3. To decide, given an abduction problem P and a proposition p, whether all
explanations for P contain p is Πp2-complete.
These results also hold for subset-minimal explanations.
Eiter and Gottlob [EG95] also studied the complexity of abduction for prefer-
ence relations other than subset-minimality, but to include these results here would
go beyond the scope of this survey. As in most cases the complexity of the first
and the third problem in Theorem 6.1 can be derived from the question whether
an explanation exists, we will henceforth focus on the complexity of deciding the
existence of an explanation.
Due to its applications to knowledge-based systems, it is natural to consider the
complexity of this problem in Schaefer’s framework. Using this approach Creignou
and Zanuttini [CZ06] showed that the complexity of deciding the existence of an
explanation forms a trichotomy. Define the explanation existence problem for
sets of relations from S as the problem to decide, given a set Γ of applications
of relations from S , a set A ⊆ Vars(Γ) of propositions, and a proposition q ∈
Vars(Γ) \ A, whether there exists a set E ⊆ Lits(A) such that Γ∪ E is consistent and
Γ ∪ E |= q. Say that a relation R is IHS-B− if if it coincides with the models of a
CNF formula whose clauses are all of one of the following types: (xi), (¬xi1 ∨ xi2),
(¬xi1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬xik) for some k > 0. Analogously say that a relation R is IHS-B+ if if
it coincides with the models of a CNF formula whose clauses are all of one of the
following types: (¬xi), (¬xi1 ∨ xi2), (xi1 ∨ · · · ∨ xik) for some k > 0. Clearly, any
IHS-B− formula (resp. IHS-B+) formula is Horn (resp. dual Horn).
Theorem 6.2 ([CZ06]) Let S be a set of relations. Then the explanation existence
problem for sets of relations from S is
1. Σp2-complete if S is not Schaefer,
2. NP-complete if S is either Horn or dual Horn but neither bijunctive nor
affine nor definite Horn nor IHS-B+ nor IHS-B−,
3. in P if S is bijunctive or affine or definite Horn or IHS-B+ or IHS-B−.
As for restricted sets Γ the restriction of the query q to a positive proposition
does no longer come without loss of generality, variants of this problem have
been studied, where the observation is a term (a conjunction of literals), a clause
or an arbitrary formula. For example, if one allows for the query to be a literal
instead of a proposition, then the explanation existence problem for definite Horn
relations becomes NP-complete (apart from that, the classification of Theorem 6.2
remains valid). For the case that the observation is a term, a trichotomy has been
established in [NZ05]: here only the case that all relations are affine remains
tractable, while Horn relations, dual Horn relations and relations expressible using
either only (¬xi1 ∨ xi2), or only (xi1 ↔ xi2) and (xi1 ∨ xi2), or only (xi1 ↔ xi2) and
(¬xi1∨¬xi2) lead to NP-complete fragments. Further loosening the restriction on the
observations to allow for an arbitrary formula leads to a dichotomic classification
into NP-complete fragments (if the set of relations is Schaefer) and Σp2-complete
fragments (in all other cases). These results are summarized and extended to also
cover clauses and arbitrary formulae and to several restrictions on the hypothesis
in [NZ08].
Seeking further insights into the sources of complexity, abduction has also been
studied for restricted sets of Boolean functions. In [CST10], Creignou, Schmidt
and Thomas completely classified the complexity of the explanation existence
problem for B-formulae, defined as the problem to decide, given a given a set
Γ ⊆ L(B) a set A ⊆ Vars(Γ) of propositions, and an observation q ∈ Vars(Γ) \ A,
whether there exists a set E ⊆ Lits(A) such that Γ ∪ E is consistent and Γ ∪ E |= q.
Theorem 6.3 ([CST10]) Let B be a finite set of Boolean functions. Then the
explanation existence problem for B-formulae is
1. Σp2-complete if S02 ⊆ [B] or S12 ⊆ [B] or D1 ⊆ [B],
2. NP-complete if S00 ⊆ [B] ⊆ M or S10 ⊆ [B] ⊆ M or D2 ⊆ [B] ⊆ M, and
3. in P in all other cases (that is, if [B] ⊆ E or [B] ⊆ V or [B] ⊆ L).
The complexity of this problem for observations represented by clauses, terms
and B-formula was also classified. The relaxation to clauses does not alter the
complexity classification; however, the relaxation to observations represented
by terms increases the complexity of the cases satisfying [B ∪ {0, 1}] = V to
NP-completeness. Lastly, if the observation is formalized as a B-formula then
the classification becomes dichotomic with the clones above E, V or L being Σp2-
complete and all remaining clones being tractable; thus skipping the intermediate
NP level.
The complexity of propositional abduction has thus been systematically studied
and is well understood. The counting complexity of abduction was first studied by
Hermann and Pichler [HP07, HP08]. The problems arising in this context are the
problem to count the number of all explanations as well as the problem to count
the number of minimal explanations with respect to a given preference relation,
e.g., the subset-minimal explanations or explanations of minimal cardinality. From
the set of counting problems for abduction studied by Hermann and Pichler, we
will consider the following two problems:
(Explanation counting) Given a set Γ ⊆ L, a set A ⊆ Vars(Γ), and a conjunction
q1∧ · · ·∧qn or propositions from Vars(Γ) \A, to count the number of all sets E ⊆ A
such that Γ ∪ E is consistent and Γ ∪ E |= q1 ∧ · · · ∧ qn.
(Subset-minimal explanation counting) Given a set Γ ⊆ L, a set A ⊆ Vars(Γ),
and a conjunction q1 ∧ · · · ∧ qn or propositions from Vars(Γ) \ A, to count the
number of all sets E ⊆ A such that Γ ∪ E is consistent and Γ ∪ E |= q1 ∧ · · · ∧ qn.
Theorem 6.4 ([HP07]) The explanation counting problem and the subset-minimal
explanation counting problem are #·coNP-complete via subtractive reductions.
However, if one restricts Γ be be a set of applications of relations from a fixed
set S of available relations, then the counting complexity drops by at least one
level of the counting polynomial hierarchy: The explanation counting problem for
sets of relations from S is #P-complete if S is Horn or dual Horn or bijunctive;
it is contained in FP if S is affine and the explanations are allowed to contain
literals instead of propositions. On the other hand, the subset-minimal explanation
counting problem for sets of relations from S is #P-complete in all of the previously
mentioned cases.
In addition to these results, the complexity of counting all explanations in the
case that Γ is represented by a set of B-formulae and the observation is a single
proposition was also studied in [CST10]. There both variants, to count the number
of (positive) explanations and to count the number of literal explanations, have
been studied.
Theorem 6.5 ([CST10]) Let B be a finite set of Boolean functions. Then the
explanation counting problem for sets of B-formulae is
1. #·coNP-complete if S02 ⊆ [B] or S12 ⊆ [B] or D1 ⊆ [B],
2. #P-complete if V2 ⊆ [B] ⊆ M or S10 ⊆ [B] ⊆ M or D2 ⊆ [B] ⊆ M, and
3. in FP in all other cases (that is, if [B] ⊆ E or [B] ⊆ L),
via subtractive reductions. If explanations are restricted to contain positive literals
only, then the problem is contained in FP for V2 ⊆ [B] ⊆ V and only known to be
in #P for L2 ⊆ [B] ⊆ L.
The open case in Theorem 6.5 is equivalent to the case where Γ is restricted to
a set of affine relations. This case was already left open in [HP07].
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